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Abstract
Medical malpractice claims are dwindling. Total payouts are far lower than during the
2002 crisis. Yet, insurance industry profits have been sinking for a decade and are nearly in the
red. After a dozen years with a “soft” insurance market, we are now on the cusp of yet another
malpractice insurance crisis.
How can profits be in peril if claims have dwindled and payouts are historically low?
Answering that question requires an understanding of the insurance cycle. The cycle
periodically transforms gradual increases in costs and gradual decreases in revenue into
explosive increases in premiums.
The industry’s financial statistics today eerily resemble those leading into the 2002
crisis. However, some important differences also exist. Perhaps most importantly, the
coronavirus pandemic introduces a variable that makes the current transition from a soft
market to a hard one unique. In addition, industry representatives have recognized the signs of
a hardening market earlier in the transition than they have in the past and that may enable
them to engineer a less painful transition from a soft market to a hard one.
The stakes are high. After each of the three prior crises, physicians, hospitals, and
insurers descended on state capitals and lawmakers responded with waves of restrictive tort
reform.
This Article explains how we have come to sit on the cusp of a fourth medical
malpractice crisis and examines the factors that will determine how soft our landing will be.
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INTRODUCTION
The profits of medical malpractice insurers have nearly disappeared. After years of
decline, premiums are now rising. Industry experts warn that the market is hardening. In
addition, experts worry that the COVID-10 pandemic has placed difficult burdens on
overstretched health care providers--burdens that could lead to medical errors.
Yet, medical malpractice claims have declined steadily for most of the last fifteen years.
So have the number of paid claims. The total amount paid to settle claims is forty percent
below its peak in 2002. How can we be headed for another medical malpractice insurance
crisis?
The answer lies in the mechanics of the insurance cycle. During the intense competition
of a “soft market,” carriers keep premiums down to acquire and retain customers. Although
this eventually leads to dangerously low profits, carriers keep premiums low to preserve market
share. The pressure on profits eventually becomes so strong that carriers across the sector raise
premiums dramatically, creating a new “hard market” and causing cries of pain and outrage
from hospitals and physicians. Since the rise of modern medical malpractice litigation in the
1960’s, this cycle has produced a malpractice insurance crisis every ten or fifteen years.
The stakes are high. During the 1974-78 hard market, California physicians went on a
four-week strike, “causing public hospitals to overflow with patients” leading to “a number of
‘job actions’ in other states.” 1 In the 1985-86 hard market, many providers could not find
coverage at any price.2 Time Magazine ran a cover story, “Sorry, America, Your Insurance has
been Canceled,” and Congress held hearings. During the most recent 2002-2006 hard market,
doctors again when on strike. 3 The president of American Medical Association, Richard Corlin,
claimed that limits on injured patients’ rights to sue were needed because “[m]any
practitioners, both generalists and specialists, just can’t afford the liability premiums, forcing
them to retire early, limit their practice or relocate.” 4
After the first crisis in the mid-1970’s, at least half of the states responded with major
tort reform legislation.5 After the mid-1980’s hard market, 46 states enacted new or additional
restrictions. And after the third crisis in 2002-2006, half passed additional tort reforms including
new or lower damage caps.
We are now on the cusp of yet another malpractice insurance crisis. The financial
statistics eerily resemble those leading into the 2002 crisis. At the same time, some important
differences also exist. Perhaps most importantly, the coronavirus pandemic introduces a
variable that makes the current transition from a soft market to a hard one unique.
This Article explains how we have come to sit on the cusp of a fourth medical
malpractice crisis and examines the factors that will determine how soft our landing will be.
J. ROBERT HUNTER, JOANNE DOROSHOW, AND DOUGLAS HELLER, HOW THE CASH-RICH INSURANCE INDUSTRY FAKES CRISES AND
INVENTS SOCIAL INFLATION 36 (2020) [hereinafter HUNTER, DOROSHOW AND HELLER] (a report for the Consumer Fed. of
America and the Ctr for Justice & Democracy)
2
Id.
3
Bruce Bartlett, Doctors on Strike, TOWNHALL, Feb 28, 2003, Doctors on strike by Bruce Bartlett (townhall.com).
4
HUNTER, DOROSHOW AND HELLER, supra note 1, at 12.
5
Id. at 36.
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I.

A NEW HARD MARKET IS EMERGING

Profits have fallen to dangerous levels in the medical professional liability (MPL)
insurance sector and premiums are increasing. 6 The most pointed warnings come from
publications that follow the insurance industry. With phrases such as “the reckoning is here”
and “the good times are ending,” 7 industry observers have concluded that a hard market is
coming. 8 Many have concluded that premiums are climbing and are under pressure to continue
that climb.9
Matt Gracey, the CEO of malpractice insurance broker Danna-Gracey, believes
policyholder rate increases in the 5% range for smaller groups are on the lower end of the scale.
Large multispecialty groups have seen their rates go up by as much as 100% over the last 18
months. He adds “every A-rated carrier specializing in malpractice insurance now is running a
combined loss ratio of over 100%, meaning that for every dollar of premium they bring in
they’re paying out more than a dollar, which means they have to raise their rates.” 10
These worries are not just hype from media and public relations consultants. The
concerns are shared by the most respected authorities in the field of liability insurance. Both
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and industry analyst AM Best are
warning of trouble ahead.
The NAIC is the most authoritative source of industry data, compiling data from nearly
3,000 insurance companies responsible for over 95% of premiums written in the U.S.11 In 2019,
according to the NAIC, the industry combined ratio—a key measure of profitability-- reached its
worse level in a decade. 12 In its April 2020 report, the Commissioners concluded:
Since 2014, the medical professional liability line has experienced rising loss costs and
diminishing reserving redundancies due to increased claims severity and frequency that
See infra text at notes # (profits falling) and # (policyholder rates increasing).
Katie Dwyer, The Reckoning is Here for the Medical Professional Liability Market. Here’s What Will Change : Risk
& Insurance (riskandinsurance.com), December 21, 2018.
8
E.g., Susan J. Forray and Chad C. Karls, , Med. Prof. Liab. Assn., A Hardening Market Arrives in Time to Greet a
Global Pandemic: The year 2019 marked a turning point for the medical professional liability (MPL) insurance
industry, INSIDE MED. LIABILITY (2d Qtr. 2020); MAGMUTUAL, The Current State of the Medical Malpractice Market, Jan.
15, 2020 (‘the medical malpractice segment is transitioning back to a hard market”),
https://www.magmutual.com/learning/article/current-state-medical-malpractice-market/; MAGMUTUAL; AM BEST,
Observers Say Medical Liability Market Beginning to Harden as Higher Jury Awards, Eroding Tort Reform Sink In
(ambest.com), December 23, 2019 01:52 PM (EST) (“In 2019, the market transitioned to a hardening market”);
Fitch Ratings, The Property/Casualty Underwriting Cycle (Shallower Market Peaks and Valleys Ahead)
(fitchratings.com), Nov. 13, 2019 - 3:19 PM ET (“The P/C market is in a hardening pricing phase”)
9
Gloria Gonzalez, Medical malpractice insurers under pressure, Best, BUS INS., May 7, 2019,
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20190507/NEWS06/912328310/Medical-malpracticeinsurers-underpressure-AM-Best-report 3.
10
Jeff Bendix, What’s happening with cost and claims in the wake of COVID-19 | Medical Economics, October
2020, Vol. 97, Issue 14.
11
NAIC, REPORT ON PROFITABILITY BY LINE BY STATE in 2019 1 (2020) [hereinafter NAIC by Line 2020]
12
NAIC, U.S. PROPERTY & CASUALTY AND TITLE INDUSTRIES: 2019 FULL YEAR RESULTS (2020), YE2019 Industry Report.pdf
(naic.org) [hereinafter, NAIC 2020]
6
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has contributed to negative underwriting results. As such, the medical professional
liability writers enter the pandemic in the worst financial position in over a decade. 13
An equally pessimistic report came from Best in April 2020. Best is a highly respected
global credit rating agency specializing in the insurance industry. Best announced a “negative”
outlook for the medical profession liability sector (MPL) in 2020 and 2021 after the field had
experienced “notable deterioration” in 2019 and faced several challenges going forward.14 In
its view, the sector enters its “weakest point in almost two decades” and faces “dim prospects
for …profitability.” 15
The pandemic has magnified these fears. Best, in particular, has expressed serious
concerns about the impact of the COVID pandemic on medical errors and on the industry’s
ability to implement planned rate increases, as discussed further below.16
The villains for this new hard market have already been chosen. Since 2019, industry
publications have identified “nuclear verdicts” 17 and “social inflation” 18 as the culprits.
A. Profits are Disappearing
According to NAIC data, the industry’s profits have declined steadily since their peak in
2010. Figure 1 shows the decline in profits using a common metric called Profit on Insurance

Fig. 1--Profit on Insurance Transactions
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Id. (emphasis added).
BUS. WIRE, Best’s Market Segment Report: U.S. Medical Professional Liability Insurance Market Remains in Flux |
Business Wire, April 29, 2020, 10:20 AM EDT.
15
AM BEST, MARKET SEGMENT REPORT: US MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE MARKET REMAINS IN FLUX, 1 (April 28,
2020) (emphasis added) (copy on file with the author) [hereinafter, BEST 2020].
16
Id. at 1. See infra text at notes #.
17
E.g., Amy Buttell, Nuclear Verdicts Escalate: Verdicts rise as more awards exceed $100M,
INSIDE MEDICAL LIABILITY, First Quarter 2020, at 1, Nuclear Verdicts Escalate Verdicts (mplassociation.org)
18
HUNTER, DOROSHOW AND HELLER, supra note 1, at 16-18 (collecting references).
13
14
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Transactions. 19 It represents the ratio of revenue to expenses and takes into account
investment returns along with premiums. It is commonly expressed as a percent of
premiums. 20 Profit on insurance transactions peaked at 27.4 percent of premiums in 2010 and
has fallen since then to only 2 percent of premiums in 2019 (the last year reported by NAIC).
This is the lowest level reported since the eve of the 2002 malpractice insurance crisis, also
shown in Figure 1.
If investment returns are set aside, the industry is already operating at a loss. Its
premiums do not cover its operating costs (the costs of underwriting, selling and settling
claims), as shown in Figures 8 and 13, later in this article. Investment returns have preserved a
2 percent overall profit as of 2019, but that too will disappear if operating losses continue to
climb. These statistics explain why industry experts fear that the long soft market is finally
turning hard.
B. The Paradox: Medical Malpractice Claims Are Declining
Medical malpractice litigation has been shrinking. Both the number of claims made and the
number of claims paid have dropped far below their peaks. Paid claims against physicians are
now roughly half as frequent as when the last crisis began in 2001. Likewise, the total amount
spent by insurers to satisfy these claims dropped steadily from roughly 2001 to 2010. Though
the total spend has grown since then, the rate of growth paralleled consumer and medical
inflation. Here, too, the current levels are substantially below the levels of 2001.
1. A sharp drop in the number of claims
Patients are filing far fewer claims than they did before the last crisis. The best data come
from a large 10-year analysis done by CRICO Strategies in 2018, finding that claims dropped
27% in the ten-year period between 2007 and 2016. 21 The report analyzed over
124,000 MPL claims and reflected the medical professional liability experience of more than
500 hospitals and health care entities along with 180,000 physicians from commercial and
captive insurers nationwide, representing approximately 30 percent of all US medical
malpractice claims and suits. 22
The authors called the decline “dramatic” and found that declines were “universal across
many segments of health care delivery.” 23 Overall, the frequency of litigation dropped from 5.1
cases per 100 physicians to 3.7 cases. OG/GYNs benefited the most with claims dropping 44%.24

NAIC, REPORT ON PROFITABILITY BY LINE BY STATE. The data were collected from each of the annual reports for all
reported years--from 2005 to 2019.
20
NAIC 2012 Sample, REPORT ON PROFITABILITY BY LINE BY STATE IN 2011, at p. 5 (“Profit on insurance transactions is
equal to underwriting profits plus investment gain on insurance transactions minus estimated related federal
income taxes.”).
21
CRICO STRATEGIES, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN AMERICA: A 10-YEAR ASSESSMENT WITH INSIGHTS 4 (2018).
22
Id. at 1.
23
Id. at 4.
24
Id.
19
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This decline is a decidedly mixed blessing. While this decline in claiming may be good news
for industry profits, it is a tragedy for victims of medical negligence. Medical errors are not
declining. The research on this issue is persuasive. Instead, pursuit of modest medical
negligence claims is becoming more difficult, as discussed further below. Before the recent
decline in claims, only a tiny fraction of negligently injured patients received any compensation.
Today, the number is even smaller.
2. A declining number of paid settlements
The number of paid claims each year against physicians and other health care
practitioners declined steadily from 2001 to 2016 and has remained steady since then. The best
data come from the National Practitioner Data Base (NPDB). All payments made to settle
claims against individual health care practitioners have been reportable to the NPDB since
1990. As shown in Figure 2, 25 NPDB data show that the number of paid claims against all
individual health care providers (blue) steadily declined after the crisis of 2001, shrinking from
19,772 paid claims in 1991 to 11,538 in 2019—a drop of 42 percent.
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Fig. 2-Number of Paid Claims, NPDB 1991-2020
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For physicians (not shown), the drop has been even sharper, falling 47 percent between
2001 and 2019. Setting aside the low 2020 number as a pandemic aberration, the 2019
numbers are the lowest recorded since NPDB began collecting statistics in 1991, amounting to
61 percent of the number of paid claims in that year.
When the statistics are adjusted to take population growth into account (orange), the
number of paid claims for all practitioners reported by NPDB is now less than half of what it
was in 1991 (47%).
25

NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, The NPDB - Data Analysis Tool (hrsa.gov) (last visited March 8, 2021).
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A detailed review of the NPDB data from 1997 to 2014 found that “[t]he decrease
occurred across all specialties, although the magnitude of the decline varied markedly by
specialty, and was significant in each specialty except cardiology.” 26 The study found that in
2014 one paid claim was reported each year for every 100 physicians. 27 By 2019, only one
claims was paid for every 28,572 Americans.
However, the numbers must be interpreted with some caution because the NPDB data
have a weakness that understate the number of claims paid on behalf of practitioners.
Payments on behalf of institutions, rather than individuals, need not be reported to the
NPDB. 28 Some hospitals and health care organizations have recently begun to shield their
affiliated providers from an adverse report to the data bank by settling a case with the
understanding that claims against individual providers will be dismissed.29 The extent of this
corporate shielding is not known.
At present, however, the NPDB data is the best that we have. It shows a steady decline
in the number of claims paid. Furthermore, that trend is consistent with the great reduction in
the number of claims filed, discussed above, which was deduced directly from insurer files.
3. The total value of settlements is far below prior levels and is rising gradually.
The two best sources of national data on the total value of malpractice settlements are
the National Practitioner Data Base, for individual providers, and AM Best, for statistics on
losses paid by MPL carriers.

Adam C. Schaffer, et al., Rates and Characteristics of Paid Malpractice Claims Among US Physicians by Specialty,
1992-2014, 177 JAMA INT. MED. 710, 717 (2017).
27
Id. at 710.
28
Id. at 714. Underreporting could also lead to an underestimation of payouts. But a study using the files of a large
malpractice insurer found only small discrepancy. Id. at 717.
29
Id.
26
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FIg.3--Paid Losses, NPDB, 1991-2020
($M; nominal and CPI-adjusted)
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Figure 3 uses data from National Practitioner Data Bank. Those data show a steady climb
in the value of payouts from 1991 to 2001, leading up to the last crisis, and then an equally
steady decline in both nominal (dotted line) and CPI-adjusted dollars (solid line) from 2002 to
2010. Around 2010, nominal payouts leveled off, though payouts in real dollars continued to
fall. 30 Payouts reached their bottom in 2017 in both nominal and real dollars and then rose
slightly in 2018 and 2019. The total paid in 2019 amounted to only 64% of the total paid in
2001 in CPI-adjusted dollars.
It is useful, at this juncture, to look back at Figure 1 and note that profits began a steady
descent in 2010 that continues to the present. Yet, Figure 3 shows that tort payout levels were
stable between 2010 and 2017. That paradox will be discussed further in Parts II and III.

30

NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, The NPDB - Data Analysis Tool (hrsa.gov) (last visited March 8, 2021).
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Here, too, corporate shielding may mean NPDB data failed to detect a recent rise in
payouts. However, that risk is significantly mitigated by data from AM Best, which indicate that
real payouts shrank markedly from 2003 to 2011 and have risen quite gradually since then. In
Figure 4, 31 the top blue line is adjusted for medical inflation, the middle yellow line is adjusted
for CPI and the bottom gray line shows unadjusted “nominal” dollars. As of 2019, total paid CPIadjusted losses (yellow) were 40 percent below their 2002 level. After adjusting for consumer
inflation, the payout levels of the last decade are the lowest since the early 1990s. When
adjusted using the medical inflation index (blue), payout levels are the lowest since the early
1980s.

Fig. 4--Paid Losses, Best 1975-2019 ($M)
Nominal, CPI and Med Inflation-Adjusted
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However, the Best data from the most recent years (2011-2019) show that nominal
payments (gray) did begin to rise again in 2011 and have risen slowly for nearly a decade. This
is shown in more detail in Figure 5, next. 32 This is a more pessimistic picture than that drawn by
the NPDB data, where the recent upturn did not begin until 2018. Nevertheless, the rate of
growth has been modest. Nominal payments since 2011 have risen 3 percent annually, 33 only
0.8 percent faster than consumer prices (yellow) and more slowly than the medical inflation
that drives settlement costs up (blue).

The AM Best data for this figure were compiled from HUNTER, DOROSHOW AND HELLER, supra note 1; J. ROBERT
HUNTER AND JOANNE DOROSHOW, AMERICANS FOR INSURANCE REFORM (now the Consumer Federation of America), STABLE
LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES 2016 and private communications with AM Best (providing updated data for the years since
2011). I owe a thank you to the Consumer Federation of America and to Best for sharing data.
32
Id.
33
See also AON/ASHRM HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY BENCHMARK REPORT, Exec. Summary, 4 Oct. 2020,
2020-AonASHRM-HPL-Executive-Summary.pdf (indemnity predicted to rise 3%).
31
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Fig. 5--Paid Losses, Best 2011-2019 ($M)
Nominal, CPI and Med Inflation-Adjusted
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As with the NPDB figures, this modest inflation-driven growth seems insufficient to
trigger a new hard market, especially considering today’s historically low level of indemnity
losses. Part II, however, will explain how the messy mechanics of the insurance marketplace
transform gradual increases in nominal costs—costs that merely mirror inflation--into dramatic,
sudden increases in premiums. In the logic of the insurance cycle, an historically low level of
payouts is much less important than multiple years of declining profits, whatever their cause.
4. Average settlement size, “social inflation,” and “nuclear” verdicts
Voices in the industry point to the growth of “nuclear verdicts” and the increasing
severity of indemnity payments as the cause of declining profits. One industry executive noted
that “[o]ver the last three years there has been a steady uptick in judgments exceeding $10
million, many coming in venues not traditionally considered high risk. 34 In its annual survey,
ASHRM/Aon found a “continual increase in large claim frequency of claims greater than
$5M.” 35 The CRICO study also found an increase in high-indemnity payments of ($3M–11M)
between 2007 and 2016, though it found they are “still rare.” 36
The perception that “nuclear” verdicts are driving down industry profits has given rise to
terminology that places the blame for the industry’s predicament on juries. Commentators
now talk of “social inflation”—a free-wheeling public attitude toward compensatory damages.
In the spring of 2019, when the Consumer Federation of American and the Center for Justice &
Democracy reviewed the language being used in the press, they found that references to
MAGMUTUAL, supra note 8. See also Todd Shryock, Which direction are malpractice rates headed and why? MED.
ECON., Sept. 27, 2019, Which direction are malpractice rates headed and why? | Medical Economics (noting both
an increase and novel venues).
35
Virginia Jones, et al., Beazley Group and Aon, Understanding Changes in the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Market 1, 9-12, Oct. 2020, 10604_HPL Benchmark Report_R7.indd (beazley.com)
36
CRICO STRATEGIES, supra note 21, at 9.
34
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nuclear verdicts and social inflation were still intermittent, but by late 2019, the entire industry
seemed to have “gotten the memo.” 37 This terminology has now made its way into the most
respected industry publications. Best’s 2020 report noted that the “vast majority of MPL
companies have begun to see a rise in ‘nuclear’ verdicts and average indemnity losses that are
much higher than historical averages.” 38
But this focus on rising average verdicts and settlements is misleading in at least four
respects. First, total payouts determine industry profitability, not the average size of individual
settlements. In the case of medical malpractice insurance, the number of payments has
declined so markedly over the past twenty years that total payouts are still lower than during
prior hard markets and are climbing at rate lower than medical inflation.
Second, “nuclear” verdicts certainly do occur, perhaps more often than in the past and
probably in new places. 39 But these awards are typically reduced, often substantially, by courts
or in settlement before payment.40 Moreover, they are not typical. The authors of the CRICO
study agreed, stating:
extraordinary jury awards draw media attention, pique the interest of reinsurers, and
can skew the focus of patient safety improvements, but they remain rare. Per 1,000
cases closed, only one or two cases closed with more than $5 million indemnity. Outlier
payments (those exceeding $11M) had a minimal impact on overall indemnity trends. 41
Another industry publication observed, we “are not seeing it have an overall statistical effect on
losses.” 42
Third, the rise in average payments can be fully explained by medical and consumer
inflation. Past and future medical expenses constitute a major component of recoverable
damages in medical malpractice cases, especially in states that have capped pain and suffering
damages. 43 As a result, malpractice awards and settlements are strongly influenced by medical
inflation. According to CRICO, the median payment has increased in line with consumer
inflation and average payouts are rising more slowing than medical inflation. 44 As noted above,
the Best data for the last decade show the same trend. Since none of the parties complaining
about the climb in damages is advocating for a cap on medical billing, it seems unfair to
complain about payments that are driven in large part by the medical bills of negligently injured
patients.

HUNTER, DOROSHOW AND HELLER, supra note 1, at 16.
E.g. BEST 2020, supra note 15, at 23.
39
E.g. Shyrock, supra note 34 (“we’re seeing, as an industry, more large verdicts in places that have never had one
like that”).
40
David Hyman, et al., Do defendants pay what juries award? Post-verdict haircuts in Texas medical malpractice
cases:1988–2003. 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 2007; Neil Vidmar, Juries and Medical Malpractice Claims Empirical Facts
versus Myths, 467 CLIN. ORTH. RELAT. RES. 367, 373 (2009).
41
HUNTER, DOROSHOW AND HELLER, supra note 1, at 39-40 (quoting the CRICO study).
42
Shyrock, supra note 34 (quoting Bill Fleming, the chief operating officer for The Doctors Company].
43
See BEST 2020, supra note 15, at 7 (pointing out the role of “rising medical loss costs” in driving loss ratios)
44
CRICO STRATEGIES, supra note 21, at 8.
37
38
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Finally, the average settlement is rising because small medical malpractice claims are
disappearing. The blue line in Figure 6 shows the declining number of cases resolved for
amounts under $500,000 in 2020 dollars.45 Since 2001, the number of these has fallen 46
percent.
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These smaller settlements have not been replaced by growth in larger settlements. As
shown in Figure 6, large settlements constitute a surprisingly small fraction of all claims and
have remained a small fraction over the entire period. The green line shows settlements
between half a million and one million dollars and the red line shows the number of
settlements at or above $1 million in 2020 dollars. Both categories have declined in frequency
since their peak in 2003-04. The number of settlements over $1 million in 2020 dollars (red line)
has fallen by 38 percent since its peak in 2003.
Small claims are disappearing because malpractice cases have become extremely
expensive to litigate.46 As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys are screening their clients closely for
large and readily proven economic loss. 47 That has caused an upward shift in the severity of
claims being litigated which, in turn, ought to drive up the dollar value of the average
settlement substantially.
To recap, fewer cases are being filed than ever before; smaller cases are dwindling
dramatically. Fewer claims are being resolved with payment. Total payouts are significantly
NPDB, supra note 22.
See NAIC, U.S. PROPERTY & CASUALTY AND TITLE INSURANCE INDUSTRIES | 2018 FULL YEAR RESULTS at 7 (“the complexity
involved in discovering negligence [for MPL claims] results in a higher percentage of premium going toward
defense and cost containment expenses”)
47
TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 59 (2005); Schaffer et al., supra note 27, at 715 (noting that attorneys
don’t take small cases).
45
46
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lower in real dollars than they were during the 2002 crisis. According to Best, but not NPDB,
payments in real dollars began rise along with consumer and medical inflation in 2010.
Inflation alone could explain that rise, as could the increasing severity of the cases remaining in
the claims pool.
Why then is the malpractice insurance market hardening? That requires an
understanding of the insurance business cycle.
II.

THE INSURANCE CYCLE

How can profits be in peril if claims have dwindled and payouts are much lower than
they were during the last hard market? Answering that question requires an understanding of
the insurance business cycle. The mechanics of that cycle also explain why the turn from a
“soft” market into a “hard” market typically involves a very sharp spike in premiums--so sharp
that providers march on state capitols.
In the insurance cycle, relatively long soft markets with low premiums swiftly transition
into much briefer hard markets where premiums turn sharply upward. 48 Then the market
softens and the cycle repeats itself. During the initial years of the ensuing soft market,
premiums are still high, and profits are too. Insurers can compete on price and still make robust
profits due to the steep premiums increases imposed during the panic of the hard market. In
soft markets, insurers want premium dollars to invest.
Investment returns are an especially important part of the MPL business model because
medical professional liability insurance has a longer gap between the sale of insurance and the
payment of claims than most other lines of property and casualty insurance (called a long
“tail”). 49 MPL insurers compete for premium dollars to invest by offering low prices and soft
underwriting.50 In fact, low premiums largely define a soft market. 51
As price competition continues, profits gradually shrink. For a time, insurers can
preserve profits by releasing surplus reserves that were accumulated during the last hard
market. 52 At the peak of the 1975, 1986 and 2002 crises, for example, the industry
overpredicted losses and, thus, raised reserves and premiums much more than proved

Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 436 (2005).
BAKER, supra note 47, at 47.
50
Fitch Ratings, supra note 8 (“Hard markets are fleeting as underwriting success attracts competition that leads to
an erosion of favorable pricing conditions.”); Sean Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting
Cycles, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 256 (2004) (insurers cut prices and loosen terms).
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note 48, at 396.
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necessary. 53 That enabled insurers to extend the ensuing soft markets by gradually releasing
redundant reserves to income.
Figure 7 shows how reserves and premiums grew much more than paid losses in 20022006 and provided a surplus which then funded a soft market that has run from 2006 to the
present. 54 This also happened in 1986. 55 The premium jump is shown in blue. The increase in is
revealed by comparing the orange line for paid losses with the red line for “incurred losses.”
Incurred losses are the sum of loss payments and new reserves for future payments. Starting in
2001 and ending in 2005, incurred losses (red) rose well above paid losses (orange), reflecting a
dramatic jump in reserves. 56 Both premiums and reserves rose more than eventually was
required. As a result, premiums could be reduced during the ensuing soft market to compete
for market share and reserves could be released into income. The combination of the two
revenue streams fueled the long soft market that is now ending.
NAIC data show the same pattern as the Best data in Figure 7; premiums and incurred
losses rose far above paid losses. The NAIC data are shown in Figure 12 in the Appendix.

Fig. 7--Premiums Written, Paid Losses, Incurred Losses,
Best 1991-2019 ($M nominal)
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Eventually, however, excess reserves are exhausted. Meanwhile, inflation increases the
cost of claims payments and operating expenses. A soft market nears its end when these rising
costs intersect with shrinking real premiums and the exhaustion of surplus reserves. During that
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carriers had underreserved during the soft market and, at the turn, decide to correct this error, p54;
underreserving allows low prices and decent profit in soft market, 56, just like release of old reserves, but adds to
explosiveness of transition to hard market.
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time, insurers are effectively selling coverage below cost. 57 Their predicament becomes dire
when operational losses exceed investment returns, depleting surplus equity and reducing
carrier ability to write new policies and to invest. 58 At this point the market moves sharply from
soft to hard. Figure 1, above, shows how profits fell to this level right before the 2002 crisis and
how profits are approaching that juncture now.
Unfortunately for health care providers, the turn from a soft market to a hard one has
always been sharp. Afraid to be the first to raise premiums, insurers have typically tolerated
eroding profits for several years, letting the pressure build. When the pressure on profits is no
longer tolerable, premiums spike sharply, exploding like the cork in a bottle of poorly handled
champagne. No wonder doctors and hospitals are outraged and mystified. Why does the same
coverage suddenly cost much more?
The central puzzle of the insurance cycle is why carriers delay the premium increases so
long that a crisis ensues. 59 Tom Baker, a superb legal analyst of insurance markets, offers an
explanation that emphasizes the psychology of insurance marketing and underwriting. It also
dovetails nicely with the industry view that highly competitive soft markets force carriers to
keep premiums low. To break from the pack is to lose your business.
The story goes like this. When the soft market begins to lose its energy, industry sales
managers and sales staff are afraid to be the first to raise premiums and lose market share.60
That puts pressure on the underwriters to keep their predictions of future losses low. 61 Doing
so will keep reserves low and, thus, allow the low premiums that fuel sales. 62 Indeed, these low
premiums may be perceived as vital to compete. 63 This inclination is reinforced with pay
incentives that reward increases in market share and the preservation of revenue, and do not
reward calls for increased reserves or premiums.64 These incentives extend all the way to the
underwriters.65
Given the uncertainty associated with predicting future losses, 66 there is ample room for
underwriter judgment to be affected. As a result, carriers are “too optimistic about future
losses for too long.” 67 The result is a “winners curse” in which the companies which win the
market competition have set prices so low that they have put themselves in financial danger.68
Scott Harrington offers the possibility that only a few “aberrant” carriers are needed to lead the
Baker, supra note 48, at 396 (selling below cost identifies a soft market)
See Harrington, Tort Liability, Insurance Rates, and the Insurance Cycle, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL
SERVICES: 2004 97, 119; Fitzpatrick, supra note 50, at 261 (noting that robust interest rates can lengthen a soft
market).
59
Id.
60
BAKER, supra note 47, at 56 (pressure to keep prices low).
61
Id. See Harrington, supra note 58, at 133 (noting revenue gains of the low-priced firms).
62
Baker, supra note 48, at 397 (insurers use these predictions to estimate the level of reserves needed).
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BAKER, supra note 47, at 57.
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Baker, supra note 48, at 418.
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developments that will increase malpractice claims, the rate of medical inflation, changes in legal rules including
the standard of care, any changes in the cost of defense, and future investment returns.”) See also id. at 410, 423.
67
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market down, generating the winners curse effects. 69 Other insurers then feel obliged to follow
the market down to preserve market share and premium revenue.70
Underwriters may also be understandably reluctant to render internally unpopular
opinions that differ from those being made by underwriters at other companies. Herd
mentality makes it seem much safer to wait until the rest of the pack is ready to raise prices.71
Interestingly, the Consumer Federation of America and the Center for Justice and Democracy
believe that today’s widening chorus of warnings about a “hardening” market and “social
inflation” is one way that carriers ask each other whether it is time to start raising premiums en
masse. 72
This suggestion of group psychology and shared communication may also provide a clue
to one of the remaining mysteries of the insurance cycle: why are the peaks and troughs of the
insurance cycle so closely aligned across the many lines of casualty insurance? Despite such
disparate lines as auto, surety, fire, crop, homeowners, inland marine, workers compensation,
and product liability, the overall P/C industry has a cycle that mirrors that of medical
malpractice insurance, as shown in the following chart from the Insurance Information
Institute.73 Each peak in premium increases for the P/C industry perfectly matches one of the
three crises in the medical malpractice industry.
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Today, too, the woes of the MPL sector are widely shared. The next chart is from the
NAIC and it shows twelve P/C sectors, including medical professional liability insurance, where
operating expenses were more than 100 percent of premiums in 2019. A hard market is
coming for many sectors.

Something is driving the sectors toward joint experience, much like two pendulums
oscillating on a single bar. Perhaps it is a combination of shared psychology and shared
information. Perhaps other common factors like investment returns have more influence than
widely understood. That is a question for another time.
For the MPL sector, at least, the long soft markets seem attributable to the success of
optimistic sales forces over more pessimistic actuaries. 74 During the final stages of a soft
market, new policies are underpriced and, to enable that, under-reserved.75 This occurred
before the 1986 and 2002 hard markets. 76 More realistic firms are destined to watch from the
sidelines until the pressure on the “winners” becomes unbearable. St. Paul’s withdrawal from
the market on the cusp of the 2002 crisis may represent just such an opting out.
As a result, pressure builds until it erupts sharply in the twin scourge of higher premiums
and greatly increased reserves. These two steps staunch the insurance industry’s bleeding but
transfer the financial pain to physicians and hospitals. They, in turn, are shocked and angered
by the sudden and dramatic increases in their malpractice insurance premiums. When they are
told that plaintiff’s attorneys and runaway juries are to blame, health care providers add their
considerable credibility and political power to that of the insurance industry and lobby for tort
reform.
Yet, the explosive force of a malpractice hard market is usually a product of prior
underpricing and its companion, under-reserving, not a sharp increase in claims costs. 77 In the
prelude to both the 1986 and 2002 hard markets, real indemnity payments had been rising, but
gradually and steadily (Fig. 5). In addition, interest rates on investments were declining before

BAKER, supra note 47, at 50 (underpricing). See Baker, supra note 48, at 414 (under-reserving) and 394 (delay in
adjusting premiums).
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BAKER, supra note 47, at 51-52.
77
BAKER, supra note 47, at 53-54 and Chart 1 (losses increased gradually, rather than spiking).
74

17

the 2002 hard market.78 These factors put gradual pressure on the soft market’s low premiums.
Yet, those pressures were ignored and allowed to build to crisis levels because insurers delayed
raising premiums. Eventually the cork popped, and prices skyrocketed. As Baker notes, price
spikes are simply an integral part of the insurance cycle. 79
Because hard markets arise out of gradually increasing pressure on profits, they can
occur even in times like ours—when claims and payments are at historically low levels. The
pressure on profits that builds in advance of each hard market can be caused by negative
changes in any of the MPL sector’s major streams of revenue or expense. The dark magic of the
insurance cycle is that it converts gradual declines in revenue and gradual increases in expenses
into sudden and steep price increases. That suddenness disrupts the business models of the
policyholders, especially doctors in high litigation specialties like neurosurgery and obstetrics
whose premiums jump the most. 80
The practice of underreserving also plays an important role in the volatility of the
insurance cycle; it is intimately tied to the problem of underpricing.81 As the market shifts from
soft to hard and premiums begin to rise, underwriters not only raise the reserve levels for new
policies, but they also correct the underreserving that took place in the final years of a soft
market in order to keep premiums down. 82 The readjustment of reserves is especially
momentous in the MPL sector because its long tail of open policies leaves a large volume of
business open to reassessment.83 The combination of larger reserves on new policies and
readjustment of reserves on old policies explains why incurred losses rose so quickly during
lead into the 2002 hard market, as shown in Figure 7, above.
This readjustment has multiple effects. First, profits plummet because the sums set
aside as reserves count against income. As Baker says, “profits fall off a cliff”—at least until the
catch-up reserving concludes and the premium spikes have their impact.84 This sharp drop in
profits—albeit brief--increases the surface credibility of regulatory requests for premium
increases and tort reform. 85 Consumer advocates even argue that overreserving is intended to
manipulate regulators. 86 According to the Consumer Federation of America, the “reserve
increases in the years 2001 to 2004 could have accounted for 60 percent of the price increases
witnessed by doctors during the period.” 87
Second, reserve readjustments push premiums up even higher than would be necessary
to pay the current predicted cost of new policies. The additional premium is needed to fund
additional reserves on old policies. In theory, the insurance companies should not possess the
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market power to charge customers for past losses. 88 New competitors who lack those losses
can underprice them. But the MPL market apparently has sufficient barriers to swift entry to
make this quick catch-up pricing possible. 89 As a result, reserving practices push premiums
much higher than current operating costs require and thus greatly magnify the disruptiveness
of the shift to a hard market.
Third, the shift in reserve practices helps fund the coming soft market. In each of the
three prior MPL hard markets, insurers set aside more in reserves than was ultimately required
to pay claims. 90 This consistency suggests that the systematic optimism of the soft market is
replaced by systemic pessimism when a soft market turns hard. This pessimism pushes
premium hikes and reserve set-asides higher than necessary to cover actual operating costs.
The silver lining is that these excess reserves can be released during the second half of the soft
market to maintain profits even as companies cut premiums to chase market share and
revenue to invest.
As a practical matter, these reserving practices are hidden from legislators and
journalists. They are not listed separately in the usual media reports of industry profitability.
Instead, reserves are counted as losses and included in the industry’s count of “incurred
losses.” To the uninitiated, the sharp increase in incurred losses that surfaces during the initial
years of a hard market gives the mistaken impression that claims payments have skyrocketed.
Instead, reserves have skyrocketed. The extra reserves are just projections—human estimates
of future losses. These predictions are subject to all the ordinary human biases, including the
systematic optimistic of the soft market and the overly pessimistic turn of the hard market.
Ironically, the spiked premiums and growing reserves virtually guarantee high profits in
the years immediately following the hard market’s peak. 91 In fact, high profits are how Finch
defines a hard market! 92 After the 2002-2004 crisis, for example, the sector posted “record
profits in 2007.” 93 Figure 7, above, shows why.
Is pressure building for the next hard market? That is the subject of Part III.
III.

ARE WE ON THE VERGE OF A CRISIS?

The medical malpractice market is unquestionably hardening. Profitability is at its lowest
level since the last hard market. Premiums are climbing. Losses are rising. Market forecasts are
overwhelmingly negative. Industry experts fear that COVID-19 will make matters worse. Their
prognosis is so dour that they have already chosen the villain for this hard market: so-called
“social inflation.” Still, we may have time to avoid a full-scale crisis.
Baker, supra note 48, at 414.
Id. at 413-14.
90
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A. The Long Soft Market is Ending
Between 2006 and roughly 2015, health care insurers and their policyholders enjoyed a
long soft market. In the beginning and middle of that market, premiums and profits were
extremely high (Figs. 1 & 7) and reserves had grown quite dramatically. As the market turned
soft around 2006, Industry premiums steadily fell in unadjusted dollars until 2017, 94 though loss
of market to self-insurance could account for some of that decline. 95 At the same time, insurers’
large reserves allowed them to preserve profitability by gradually releasing reserves into
income.
One commentator described the soft market this way:
The MPL insurance marketplace previously enjoyed decades of soft market conditions,
driving competition for buyers and insurers. Low premiums, abundant capacity, and
relaxed underwriting guidelines allowed insurers to aggressively compete for increased
market share. 96
By 2014-2016, however, the soft market was ending. The sector’s operating costs had finally
risen above its premium revenues. NAIC data show that underwriting profit had turned to
underwriting loss in 2016 (blue), as shown in Figure 8, below. AM Best reported that MPL has
experienced “aggregate underwriting losses in the past four years.” 97

Fig. 8--Underwriting Profit and Profit on Insurance
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Moreover, the combined ratio, another frequently cited profitability metric, went
negative even earlier--in 2014.98 It, too, compares operating costs to premium revenue, but
takes dividends into account and, thus, tends to show a slightly more negative outlook than
underwriting profits. 99 The data for combined ratios are shown in the Appendix in Figure 13.
Both ratios indicate that the medical malpractice insurance business is not currently paying its
own operating expenses and has not done so for several years.
Only the industry’s investment returns have kept the sector profitable, as indicated in
the gray dotted line in Figure 8 showing profit on insurance transactions, a metric which does
consider investment income. 100 But the buffer of investment gains was barely enough to keep
this metric positive in 2019 (2% of premiums). And the trend suggests that profit on insurance
transactions will soon follow underwriting profit into negative territory—a place last visited in
the hard market of 2002, also shown in Figure 8.
In addition, industry sources say that reserves have steadily been shrinking and now
offer less protection against low operating profits. 101 That, too, is consistent with end of a soft
market. 102
A 2020 NAIC report gave a negative assessment:
Since 2014, the medical professional liability line has generated negative underwriting
results due to rising loss costs and diminishing prior year reserve takedowns. For the
current year, the combined ratio worsened 8.0-points to 112.2%--a 10-year high. Results
could continue to worsen as medical professionals may have increased liability exposure
related to COVID-19.103
Finally, industry experts are detecting building pressure to raise the premiums paid by
policyholders. 104 In 2019, the journal Risk & Insurance lamented that “The Reckoning is Here for
the Medical Professional Liability Market,” noting “a decade’s worth of price erosion.” 105 Leo
Carroll, the Senior Vice President and Head of Healthcare at Berkeley Hathaway Specialty
Insurance, concluded that the industry had waited too long to respond to its profitability
challenges:
NAIC 2020, supra note 12, at 7.
Combined ratios turned negative somewhere between 2014 to 2016 depending on the data source, as shown in
Figure 13 (Appendix).
100
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Over the past several years, there has been a good deal of rationalizing and failure to
timely respond to about deteriorating conditions and poor results, and a reluctance to
make corrections needed for the overall health of the marketplace. Now we’re reaching
a point where the industry is behind, and serious improvements are necessary.
Best’s 2020 report stated “MPL insurers have been feeling rate pressure for several
years. 106 The widely used national survey of physicians by Medical Liability Monitor found that
the transition had already begun. In 2019, 28.5% of surveyed physicians reported increased
premiums in 2109, the most since 2006, after a long period of being stable or even falling. 107
Similarly, a recent panel of experts urged caution “as claims increase and medical malpractice
insurance rates surge.” 108 And Jean-Paul Rebillard, the president of a unit of Berkshire
Hathaway, opined that “we find ourselves at an inflection point in the market cycle.” 109
A report from the Medical Professional Liability Association (MPLA) supports these
observations, stating: “Rates began to increase in 2019 and are likely to continue to increase at
a faster clip in 2020. Certain markets may see double-digit rate increases.” 110 A 2019 report
from the American Society for Health Care Risk Management and Aon concluded that most
hospitals “have benefited from years of declining rates, combined with significant exposure
increase. However, this is not sustainable in the current marketplace.” 111
The price increases being reported by policyholders are starting to appear in figures for
industry premium volume as well. Premium volume began to rise in 2018 and rose still higher
in 2019 and 2020.112 Best found that premiums collected from physicians grew in 2019, even
though physicians migrated to hospital employment in 2019, suggesting that premium rates—
not just premiums collected—are climbing.113
Profits are near zero--even after taking investment gains into account. Redundant
reserves are dwindling, and premiums are starting to inch upward. The market for medical
malpractice insurance is hardening.
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This Part now turns to three follow-up questions. First, what are the factors that are
driving profits down? Second, can we have a soft landing. Third, what role will the pandemic
play in the severity of this hard market?
B. What Is Driving Profits Down?
Insurance industry profits are driven by a limited set of major expenses and income
streams. Sustained adverse trends for any combination of them can put material pressure on
premiums. This part searches for the factors contributing most heavily to the industry’s recent
decade of declining profits, looking first at revenue sources and then at expenses.
1. Inadequate Premiums
About four years after the hard market of 2002 began, premiums began a steady decline
that lasted until 2018. Cumulatively, premiums declined 35 percent since 2006 in adjusted
dollars and 22 percent in unadjusted dollars, as shown above in Figure 7 and in the Appendix
(Fig. 13). According to the Medical Liability Professional Association, the trade association for
the MPL sector, “premium decreased by $1.1 billion between 2006 and 2016—approximately
20% of the premium written at the beginning of that decade. 114 “To put that in perspective,”
observed the MPLA, “consider that in the 40-year history of the MPL industry no other period
of decreasing premium has lasted longer than two years and the greatest consecutive-year
premium reduction was 7%.” 115
At first, indemnity payments were shrinking an equal amount so profits remained near
record highs despite the decline in premiums (Figs. 1 & 7). But the sharp decline in payouts
ended in 2011. About the same time, paid losses and operating expenses both began to rise in
nominal (unadjusted) dollars. Nevertheless, premiums continued to drop in nominal dollars
until 2018 (Fig. 7) and then rose only modestly.116 Because premiums did not rise despite the
growth of both paid losses and operating costs, all three profit ratios began a steady decline in
2011 that has continued with little interruption to the most recent reporting period (Fig. 1).
The scale of the recent premium increases was insufficient to reverse the slide in
profits. As a result, Best‘s 2020 report maintains a negative outlook on the MPL segment owing
in part to “rate adequacy.” 117
These data demonstrate that the industry’s large reduction in premiums over the last
fifteen years has been a major contributor to its declining profits today. Its delay in raising
premiums after 2011, when losses and operating costs began to climb, is particularly notable.
True to the textbook insurance cycle, the combination of market pressure and human
behavioral tendencies has allowed pressure on premiums to build.
2. Exhaustion of Surplus Reserves
Forray and Karls, supra note 8.
Id.
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The industry maintained its profitability during the last half of this soft market, in part,
by releasing redundant reserves. 118 But releases have been getting smaller over the past few
years; the industry trade association concluded that “redundant reserves have been
depleted.“ 119 According to Best, “reserve releases will no longer be sufficient to prop up the
segment’s calendar year results.” 120 Berkshire Hathaway executive Leo Carroll put it this way:
Reserve redundancies are diminishing from prior years, so the market is no longer able
to mask actual current year results. While in the past a carrier could have been buffered
by prior year results, that’s no longer an option to the same extent. 121
According to Best’s calculations, over two-thirds of the deterioration of the combined ratio in
2019 was attributable to the release of fewer reserves. 122 If not for that release of reserves, the
industry would have fallen into the red. 123
These facts justify the conclusion that shrinking reserve redundancies are a significant
contributor to declining industry profits. Their apparent exhaustion will greatly increase the
mounting pressure to raise rates significantly.
3. Declining Investment Returns
NAIC data show a gradual decline in investment returns over the past fifteen years.
Returns on the investment of reserves dropped from a high of 18-19% of premiums in the early
years of the soft market to 13-14% in the last several years, with large one-time dips in 2008
and 2016. 124 (Appendix Figure 14.) Investment returns on net worth also declined gradually
over that period but were much lower and less volatile. These weakening returns probably
contributed to the decline in profits over the past decade. Nevertheless, declining premiums
and depleted reserve redundancies probably played a more important role.
4. Rising Indemnity Payments
After declining for a decade, total inflation-adjusted payouts reported by the NPDB
stabilized in 2010 and began to rise again in 2018-19, when the total amount rose slightly more
than the consumer price index. 125126 According to Best, indemnity payments have grown 20
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percent in nominal dollars since 2011 (about 3 percent annually), but have basically been flat
over the past decade when they are indexed to reflect the medical purchasing power of the
settlements. 127
Though the recent increases are explained by inflation, they are nonetheless a potential
source of pressure on profits because premiums were not raised to reflect this expense. S&P
Global, a business consulting company, explicitly noted the sector’s failure to account for
inflation, stating that “[p]erhaps the fact that losses are now piercing the excess casualty layer
is more of a function of general inflationary loss experience rather than rising social
inflation.” 128
Thus, the inflationary growth of indemnity payments has put pressure on profits, given
the failure to raise premiums.
5. Rising Costs of Defending, Underwriting and Selling
The cost of selling policies and of defending claims has grown slowly but steadily over
the past decade as a percent of premiums. The combination of internal claims adjustment and
outside defense cost is called the loss adjustment expense (LAE). According to NAIC, LAE
consumed 7.3 more cents of every premium dollar in 2019 than it did in 2010. Costs of selling
insurance also rose, consuming an extra 3.2 cents of each premium dollar.129 Together, they
accounted for about 10 points in the drop of the underwriting profit ratio, which fell 24 points
between 2010 and 2018 and another 11 points in 2019 (Fig. 8).
By 2019, defense costs consumed a remarkable 30 percent of every premium dollar (a
topic for another day) and selling expenses used 12 percent.
Because these figures represent the portion of premiums consumed by these expenses,
some of the increase could simply be a function of declining premiums. However, the rest—
perhaps, the bulk--represents an actual increase in costs. Those increasing costs put additional
pressure on profits in the absence of rising premiums.
6. Adding It All Up
Even though claims are substantially below than their peak in 2001-02 and payouts are
stable, profits are under stress and premiums are expected to rise. The key cause is a longstanding and intensely competitive market in which insurers did not believe that they could risk
raising premiums despite several worrisome trends which should have led them to do so.
Since 2010, the industry has seen rising defense costs, rising sales costs, the exhaustion
of reserve redundancies, declining investment returns and the ongoing impact of medical
inflation on indemnity payments. But real premium volume still sits at about the level of the
year 2000.
See supra text at notes 32.
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A.M. Best reached these conclusions about current pressures on profitability:
Rising medical loss costs, along with relentlessly challenging and competitive market
conditions, had pressured loss and LAE ratios over the last few years, before an even
larger increase in 2019. . . The deterioration in underwriting results [in 2019] was due
primarily to a slight rise in underwriting expenses and losses and loss adjustment
expenses (LAE), along with an 11% drop in net premiums earned (NPE). 130
Soon, given the confluence of these factors, reserve releases will no longer be sufficient
to prop up the segment’s calendar year results, which has been the norm for some time.
That means more effective risk selection, risk classification, individual account
underwriting and pricing will be needed to generate improved calendar year
underwriting results. 131
The industry trade association, MPLA, emphasized the impact of depletion of redundant
reserves and the increases in operating expenses:
Declines in reserve releases drove this deterioration in the operating ratio and increases
in underwriting expenses exacerbated it. … With a combined ratio above 100% for each
of the past four years, the industry now relies on its investment income for its
profitability. 132
The MPL sector may once again have waited too long to raise its premiums.
Industry defenders argue that there is always considerable guesswork in determining
when a soft market has ended. Investopedia says “[m]ost insurance industry watchdog
organizations believe that underwriting cycles are inevitable due to the inherent uncertainty
of matching insurance prices to future losses.” 133
However, the analysis untaken in this article shows that carriers now have the tools to
recognize the signs and determine when prudent preventive action should be taken. Several
other commentators have called for more discipline from carriers in underwriting and
pricing. 134 After the 2002 hard market, Lloyd’s named the cycle the top challenge facing the
insurance industry and undertook an extensive study. 135 In a 2006 report Managing the
Insurance Cycle, it identified seven key steps, including these two:
Don’t follow the herd. Insurers need to be prepared to walk away from markets when
prices fall below a prudent, risk-based premium.
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Get smarter with underwriter and manager incentives. Incentives for key staff should be
structured to reward efficient deployment of capital, linking such rewards to target
shareholder returns rather than volume growth.” 136
Rolf Tolle, Lloyd’s Director of Franchise Performance, added “[i]n the past, insurers have
simply accepted the insurance cycle, seeing it as a force of nature with an uncontrollable impact
on their business. But at Lloyd’s we believe that insurers now have the information and the
tools they need to manage the cycle much more effectively.” 137 Tolle concluded that “[t]here is
nothing complex about the cycle. It is about having the courage of your convictions to act with
strength."138
Similarly, Investopedia observed that “[t]he underwriting cycle perpetuates because a
majority of insurance companies place short-term gains over long-term stability without
concern for what happens when the soft market ends.”
Unfortunately, this demand for greater discipline may not be a realistic option. As Baker
points out, insurers may only have a choice between offering insurance at the going price or
leaving the market (Baker, 57). Insurers who simply raise premiums are likely to lose customers
to the companies that do not.
The Consumer Federation of America and the Center for Justice & Democracy have offer
a different solution--more regulatory scrutiny during rate setting, especially during the turn to a
hard market--but only a few states have taken that step. 139 New York reportedly experienced
some success moderating the cycle by limiting price increases in hard markets and price
decreases in soft markets, an idea that has also been proposed by J. Robert Hunter, now with
the Consumer Federation of America. But New York apparently ended that effort in 2004. More
experimentation of this kind is needed.
Both Tom Baker and I have proposed the adoption of exclusive enterprise liability as a
third option. Shifting liability exclusively to hospitals and integrated health care organizations
will not moderate the cycles, but it will transfer liability to parties who are better able buffer
themselves against the disruptions. Collective enterprise liability will also spare high-risk
specialists from shouldering a disproportionate share of the health care system’s liability costs.
Hopefully, it will also dampen the extraordinary anger felt by the physicians who practice in
those specialties. But no court or legislature has expressed even passing interest in this
proposal.
Thus, the insurance cycle continues. Periods of cutthroat competition and widespread
underpricing are followed by brief explosive corrections. We are on the verge of that transition
Insurance Canada, Seven steps to managing the cycle - Insurance-Canada.ca - Where Insurance & Technology
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today. Gradual growth in all expenses (underwriting, selling, defending, and indemnifying)
along with a gradual decline in all revenue streams (premiums, reserve releases, and
investment returns) have placed growing and continuing pressure on profits.
C. Will There Be a Soft Landing?
Though the market is hardening, some industry representatives believe that risk of a
crisis are lower today than they were immediately before the crisis of 2002. For example, Bill
Burns and Alyssa Gittleman of the global investment management firm Conning point to the
presence of more policyholder surplus and reinsurance coverage today than in 2002. 140
Reinsurance transfers a portion of the insurer’s risk to another insurer. This practice
hedges against losses and frees up capital to write more insurance contracts. 141 It’s increased
use today should provide some protection for retail carriers to the modest extent that
indemnity payments drive the loss of profits. 142
Policyholder surplus also
provides a margin of safety against
unexpected losses. In a publicly held
company, this is called equity or net
worth. In 2019, the MPL sector’s
unrealized capital gains lifted industry
surplus about 4.3 percent to $18.8
billion, despite the existence of an
underwriting loss for the year. 143
Figure 5 from the MPLA shows that
policyholder surplus is three times
larger today than it was in 2001.
Theoretically, these surpluses could be used to temper the shift to a hard market. In publicly
held companies, however, this strategy would shift some of the cost of a hard market onto
shareholders, making its use less likely.
The current capital capacity of the MPL sector may also soften the landing. So far, the
sector has avoided the departure of major carriers from the market. This contrasts with 200203, when St. Paul Fire and Marine stopped selling malpractice insurance.144 St Paul was the
largest carrier in the market and stranded over 40,000 physicians.145 In 2003, Farmers Insurance
PRWeb, Medical Liability Monitor’s 2019 Annual Rate Survey Indicates a Medical Malpractice Insurance
Premiums Rising, But Are We Headed for a Real Hard Market? (prweb.com), CISION (Oct. 3,2019) (last visited May 4,
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Company exited the market as well. Thereafter, “the market stiffened up and prices went
up.” 146 Nothing on a similar scale has occurred in recent years.
The MPLA also offers other factors which could temper the transition. For example, the
lower level of claims frequency in today’s market “has put MPL rates in a better position than
they were 20 years ago” and “the degree of rate inadequacy [is] less, and present in fewer
locales, in this most recent soft market than in the previous soft market.” 147 The authors of that
report, Forray and Karls, explain further:
In the early 2000s, the start of the hard market was steep and quick, with double-digit
rate increases common across states and carriers. In contrast, rate increases in the
emerging hard market are expected to be smaller and to vary more across markets. As
noted earlier, recent rate inadequacies have been less—both in magnitude and
geographic spread—than in the preceding soft market of the late 1990s, placing less
pressure on rates now.148
“What makes the last ten years different,” adds Best, “is that the deterioration [in
underwriting profits] has been gradual rather than sudden.” 149 MPLA qualifies its hope for a
soft landing with a warning that “certain market segments are likely to experience double-digit
rate increases during 2020 and perhaps 2021.” 150 However, the MPLA apparently believes that
these premium increases will do the job, as it expects profitability “to improve” despite
“greater uncertainty ahead.” 151
In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic may make it politically inexpedient for insurance
companies to dramatically raise the premiums paid by physicians and hospitals. Health care
providers were 24/7 rescuers during the pandemic. That public relations obstacle could force
carriers to use their available surplus to subsidize more gradual increases in premiums than
would otherwise occur.
Finally, the most hopeful sign of a softer landing is the widespread recognition of the
danger at a relatively early moment in the turn from soft to hard market. Figure 8, above,
shows that the long slide in profits from 2010 to the present has not yet reached the deep
losses that occurred in 2002. Profits on insurance transactions were still in positive territory at
the end of 2019. So, too, was the sector’s return on net worth, as shown in Figure 11, below.
Both metrics fell much further during the last hard market. That suggests that the MPL sector
may have time to raise premiums and reserves gradually, rather than steeply. It’s current
cross-talk about social inflation may enable the sector to act collectively, rather than act alone
and risk losing customers.
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Fig. 11--Return on Net Worth, NAIC 1996-2019
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In late 2019, Bill Fleming, the chief operating officer for The Doctors Company, the
nation’s largest physician-owned medical malpractice insurer said:
Part of our strategy and goal there is to not be disruptive. But if we don’t raise rates a
little bit when it’s necessary, that builds up pressure that eventually results in a large
increase, which is very disruptive from a customer perspective. Our hope and
expectation is that a small increase is more tolerable over time than a single large
increase that is disruptive to a budget. . . I think the industry needs to find a way to take
reasonable increases that can be absorbed into practices and health systems rather than
continue to defer the need to a time when you have no choice but to take a very large
increase that’s disruptive not just to the marketplace, but to practices all over the
country.” 152
These multiple factors—a much lower level of payouts than in 2002, the gradual rather
than sudden erosion of profits, wider use of reinsurance, a substantially larger industry surplus,
the politics of the moment, and the early warnings—could lead to a softer landing than
occurred in the past.
The wild card, of course, is the impact of COVID-19 on malpractice litigation.
D. The Wild Card: COVID-19
The prospects for an insurance crisis are amplified by the uncertainty resulting from the
COVID-19 pandemic. Both the NAIC and AM Best have explicitly and strongly warned of the
risks to industry finances posed by the pandemic. 153 They worry that COVID-19 exigencies have
impacted medical professionals’ ability to provide effective care, both to COVID-19 patients and
to elective patients whose care schedules have been altered or relegated to telemedicine. 154
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154
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Best has undertaken the most thorough examination of the risks pose by the pandemic
and its assessment is very pessimistic. Its analysis emphasizes the fact that providers were
overwhelmed at times by the surge of patients in serious condition. 155 The surge caused
hospital overcrowding, shortages of intensive care beds, and the use of makeshift facilities.
With the rise in patient-to-doctor ratios, providers were exhausted while at the same time
working more hours with little rest. Delays in access to care were more common, as was
reliance on telemedicine. Both raise the risk of missed diagnoses. In addition, the shortage of
providers forced the recruitment of less experienced providers who had not been professionally
trained in infectious diseases. Hospitals struggled with inadequate supplies, staffing, and
hospital space. Law professor Nicolas Terry’s analysis identifies a similar set of risks and adds to
it the use of improvised equipment and untested drugs.156 Each of these factors may have
produced additional medical errors.
Summing up, AM Best is pessimistic, concluding that the “already dim prospects for the
segment’s profitability have been clouded by COVID-19.” 157 The Medical Professional Liability
Association believes the coronavirus has “brought the arrival of a hardening market.” 158
Yet, several factors could prevent a pandemic-related surge in claims. Best concedes
that providers might be helped by “current sentiment toward health care providers,” the
absence of a well-established standard of care, and the prospect of tort immunity legislation.159
Best even speculates that “few lawyers are likely to take on lawsuits against healthcare
providers related to COVID-19, owing to healthcare provider sentiment and the difficulties of
determining the standard of care.” 160
Law professor Nicholas Terry has undertaken the most thorough review of the state and
federal laws immunity laws. 161 At the federal level, he found that the only important shield is
provide by The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005. It governs “covered
countermeasures,” such as drugs, devices, personal respiratory protective devices, and
vaccines. 162 The Department of Health and Human Services has ruled that its protections should
also extend to the decision not to use countermeasures, but at least one district had court
disagreed. 185. Even if HHS is authoritative on this issue, the law still omits many of the likely
sources of adverse events, such as overcrowding, poor hygiene, understaffing and exceeding
the scope of a practitioner’s training or licensure. And if HHS is wrong, misdiagnosis is also
unprotected.
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More helpful to providers are the liability shields enacted in 24 states as of January
These laws are broader because they focus on the overall diagnosis and treatment of
COVID-10,164 rather that primarily on drugs and devices. Terry notes that these laws may
protect providers who worked beyond their scope of training or licensure. 165
But the boundaries of these laws leave many areas for interpretation, such as their
application to non-COVID patients whose care was interrupted or altered by the pandemic, as
well as patients injured by delays and poor hospital conditions that are not directly related to
the “treatment” of their COVID-10. Even so, the immunity laws will take a large fraction of the
bad outcomes caused by negligence out of the tort system in the states that have enacted
them. That makes the concern expressed by Best and the MPL Association seem unduly
pessimistic.
Furthermore, COVID-19 lawsuits will be difficult to win. Terry points out that physicians
will offer evidence of “extenuating circumstances at the height of the pandemic such as
emergency rooms operating well above capacity and shortages of ICU beds and ventilators.” 166.
In addition, patients will often have difficulty proving that reasonable care would have
produced better outcomes. Patients can contract COVID-19 in hospital settings even when
reasonable care is taken.167 Patients can and did die in huge numbers despite access to state of
the art medical care. Indeed, the state of the art was often learned by trial and error. Thus,
both breach of care and causation will be difficult to prove.
At the same time, insurers and providers will benefit from pandemic’s reduction of the
number of bad outcomes associated with elective procedures. The pandemic effectively shut
down elective care in many hospitals for several months, thereby reducing the population of
surgeries and invasive diagnostic procedures that normally form a significant part of the
malpractice caseload.168 Many bad outcomes may have been avoided.
Overall, the warnings of a wave of COVID-based litigation were unduly pessimistic...
However, this does not guarantee a soft landing. The uncertainties associated with the
pandemic may cause underwriters to panic. Given the fears being expressed about the
pandemic’s impact on MPL insurance, underwriters may anticipate a surge of claims. If they do,
their prediction will drive premiums and reserves up, finalizing the turn into a hard market,
whether or not the surge of COVID cases ever materializes.
As a result, we are left to wait on the data from 2000, 2001 and 2002. The pandemic’s
impact on claims will not be measurable until at least 2022, when the earliest statutes of
limitations will expire. However, data on premiums, incurred losses reserves, and paid losses
will be available sooner and may reveal whether insurance companies are predicting a crisis.
Incurred losses will be an especially important indicator as it will reveal whether underwriters
are rewriting reserves.
2021.163
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As this page was being written, the American Medical Association released the results of
a 2020 survey of physicians by the Medical Liability. In 2020, 31.1 percent reported an increase
in premiums--more than any year since 2005.169 Because the increase follows jumps of 13.7
percent in 2018 and 26.5% in 2019, 170 the AMA concluded that we are in an upward trend “not
seen in over 20 years.” Although these numbers are still much lower than those in 2004 and
2004, the AMA saw the “early stages of a hard market.” 171
CONCLUSION
Claims and payments are far below their peaks and are rising in line with inflation. Yet,
insurer profits have been sinking for a decade and are nearing negative levels. Multiple factors
have contributed to the steady decline in profits. They include a long period with declining
premiums, the depletion of surplus reserves, the growing expenses of selling, underwriting, and
defending policies and a recent inflation-driven increase in payouts. In the past few years,
investment income has kept the sector in the black but barely.
At the same time, today’s insurance market differs in several important respect from
the hard market of 2002-2006. The industry’s finances are more secure and the rise in expenses
less steep. Most importantly, carriers are discussing the problem early in the turn from a soft
market to a hard one. Much will turn on the use that carriers make of that information. Will
they take the risk of raising premiums before absolutely forced to do so? If they do, they can
spread the increases in premiums over more years and reduce the risk of hasty over-reserving.
Data for 2000 and 2001 will help answer those questions.
One crucial uncertainty is the impact of COVID-19 on claiming. At the very least, the
pandemic has produced unprecedented turbulence in health care delivery. Its uncertain impact
on errors and on claiming will place pressure on underwriters to push up reserves and
premiums. If they do, the market will harden more painfully than would otherwise be
necessary.
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APPENDICES

Fig. 12--Premiums and Incurred Losses from NAIC; Paid Losses
from NPDB, 1991-2019
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Fig. 13-- Combined Ratio, NAIC and Best, 20082019 (percent of premiums)
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